The present study re-examines the effects of remittances on growth of GDP per capita using annual panel data for 24 Asia and Pacific countries. The results generally confirm that remittance flows have been beneficial to economic growth. However, our analysis also shows that the volatility of capital inflows such as remittances and FDI is harmful to economic growth. This means that, while remittances contribute to better economic performance, they are also a source of output shocks. Finally, remittances contribute to poverty reduction -especially through their direct effects. Migration and remittances are thus potentially a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts.
Introduction
In 2010, migrants from developing countries sent over $325 billion to their origin countries, far exceeding the official development assistance received. This does not include the unrecorded flows. The increase in remittances to developing countries has been due to more number of people settling abroad, and easier, faster and cheaper modes of transmitting money to another country 1 .
Empirical results on the impacts of migration on growth and poverty levels of a country are mixed. While the resulting remittances increase the income of the recipient country and consequently decrease poverty, there are social costs not accounted for in these higher incomes 2 .
On the one hand, remittances reduce work efforts and dampen long term growth, and on the other, they improve financial sector development and thus stimulate growth. Remittances have a positive impact on the credit rating of a country, provide a large and stable source of foreign currency that can curtail investor panic, help deal with balance of payments crisis, and can be used for development projects (Ratha et al., 2011) .
Remittances reduce poverty through increased incomes, allow for higher investments in physical assets and education and health, and also enable access to a larger pool of knowledge.
Inflow of workers' remittances results in physical capital accumulation through increased access to finance, although this depends on the recipients' marginal propensity to consume. For 3 instance, in Nepal, one third to one half of the reduction in the poverty headcount ratio from 42
per cent in 1995-96 to 31 per cent in 2003-04 is attributed to the increases in remittances (World Bank, 2006) . In rural Pakistan, temporary migration is associated with higher female and total school enrolment (Mansuri, 2006) . On the other hand, migration of high skilled workers can result in a brain drain (Adams, 2003; Docquier et al. 2007 ) that could have a negative impact on the growth of the country in the long run. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the impact of the financial crisis of 2008-09 on remittances. Section 3 reviews the recent literature on the relationship between remittances, economic growth and poverty. Section 4 is devoted to a review of the data and discussion of the econometric specifications used. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with observations from a broad policy perspective. 4
Financial Crisis and Remittances
The global financial crisis has had a dampening effect on the remittances received by developing countries. ADB (2011) shows that since the onset of the financial crisis, remittance flows to Asian countries have declined, primarily due to rising unemployment. Analysis of household surveys shows that, during the crisis, the number of migrant workers declined by 7 per cent for Bangladesh, 2 per cent for Indonesia and remained unchanged for the Philippines. There was a decline in incomes as a result of the crisis. 97% of households in Bangladesh, 82% in Indonesia, and 64% in the Philippines reported lower incomes. The reasons include, apart from falling remittances, job losses, wage cuts and depreciation of the peso in the Philippines. Savings as well as investments in physical and human capital declined during the crisis. As a coping mechanism, households in Bangladesh and Indonesia worked more, and in the Philippines, borrowed more.
Evidence from the Philippines shows that children dropped out from school as a result of the shock.
Although in most cases there was a decline in remittances received by developing nations in nations which were not severely affected by the financial crisis, and (iii) migrants were engaged in those jobs or industries which were relatively untouched by the financial crisis ).
Migrant workers around the world began 2011 by sending home significantly more money than they did in 2010 (IFAD, 2011) . While Pakistan showed a 34 per cent increase, Bangladesh reported a two per cent increase. This may be attributed to the rate of recovery in the United
States, the largest remitting economy. While short-term migrant labourers tend to be the first to lose their jobs during an economic downturn, they are often the first to be rehired during a recovery, so there is hope for continued improvement in global remittances as the U.S. economy continues to emerge from the crisis. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, exchange rates 
Remittances, Growth and Poverty
Remittances impact growth in the following three ways (Barajas, et al. 2009 Remittances also help in reducing consumption instability in developing countries.
Remittances act both as ex-ante risk avoidance tool as well as ex-post risk management mechanism (e.g. remittances increase after natural disasters affect a region). Combes and Ebeke (2011) use a System-GMM-IV model for a cross-sectional panel of 87 developing countries over the period to estimate the impact of remittance on consumption instability. They find that remittances significantly reduce consumption instability, the impact being stronger in financially less developed countries. However, the stabilizing impact of remittances decreases at higher levels of remittances. Remittances also increase resilience to shocks, such as natural disasters and macroeconomic shocks. 
Data and empirical strategy
where for country i at time (denoting year) t, y  denotes rate of growth of real per capita GDP, LREM is logarithm of workers' remittances expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Model of Remittances and Economic Growth
To explore the effects of remittances on growth, we first use static panel data methods, such as fixed or random effects model. However, as some of the explanatory variables, including remittances, are likely to be endogenous, we also use the panel two-stage least squares (2SLS).
Here, lagged per capita GDP, financial development, and investment are instrumented by their own lags since these are orthogonal to the error term. Our main variable of interest -remittances -is also instrumented by its own lag. In line with Chami et al. (2005), we use the income gap between each remittance receiving country and the US as an additional instrument.
Volatility of capital inflows and growth
It is generally accepted that most sources of foreign exchange for poorer countries tend to follow global economic trends, increasing in good times and decreasing in bad times. Here, we empirically test whether the volatility of two types of inflows -namely, FDI and remittances-is harmful, or beneficial to economic growth. To measure volatility, we have used the standard deviation of each variable measured over a non-overlapping 5-year period as we are interested in the steady state link between the volatility of capital inflows and growth.
For this purpose, following Love and Zicchino (2006) , we estimate a trivariate panel vector autoregression (PVAR) in the following form: Our interest lies in generating impulse response functions which depict the reaction of one variable in the system to innovations in another variable while keeping all other shocks at zero.
To make the variance-covariance matrix of the errors orthogonal, Cholesky decomposition is used where variables that come early in the ordering of the VAR system are assumed to affect the other variables contemporaneously and those that come last in the ordering are assumed to influence those listed earlier only with a lag. In our estimations, we assume that innovations in the volatility of remittances influence the other variables contemporaneously and hence the standard deviation of remittances appears first in the ordering. On the other hand, we assume that the performance of real per capita GDP in resource receiving countries does not influence the volatility of inflows within the same year. Hence, it comes last in the ordering. The matrix of the impulse response functions is based on the estimated VAR estimates and their standard errors and the confidence intervals are produced with Monte Carlo simulations.
Empirical results

Remittances and Growth
The baseline results are reported in Barajas et al. 2009 ) identifies various channels through which remittances enhance growth, including the boosting of capital accumulation, labor force growth, and total factor productivity, some of which can be controlled by government policies to intervene financial and/or labor markets. It is also conjectured that the government could mitigate any legal or institutional barriers to outmigration or promote financial liberalization policies to ban any restrictions on remittances from abroad. Introducing modernized banking systems or facilities (e.g. setting more branches of international/national banks and ATM in city areas) would also help. The coefficient of financial development is positive and relatively large, but it is not statistically significant. This becomes significant once we drop investment.
[ Table 1 
to be inserted]
The results show that macroeconomic instability in the form of high inflation is detrimental to economic growth as found in all the columns. This is in line with the conventional wisdom that a stable macroeconomic environment reduces the risks and uncertainties associated with investment projects and thus results in economics growth. Along with the banking policies, the government needs to stabilise inflation by monetary policies or other policies to curb inflation to 13 ensure economic growth. We also find that civil wars are negatively related to growth presumably because of their disruptive effects on economic activity. indicates that financial openness is likely to be associated with higher factor productivity and greater efficiency, and hence better economic performance (Bekaert et al. 2010) . 
The volatility of capital inflows and growth
An attractive feature of the PVAR is that it sidesteps endogeneity concerns by treating all the variables in the system as endogenous. Table 2 summarises the results. As may be seen from it, the volatility of both remittances and FDI is inversely related to economic performance. The coefficient estimates indicate that the negative effects of volatility are little larger with FDI than 9 Our result is in sharp contrast to Barajas et al. (2009) , which finds no relation between remittances and growth, or Chami et al. (2005) claiming that remittances negatively affect growth. The reason why we have obtained different results remains unclear, but it is surmised that focusing only on Asian countries and more recent periods may have overturned the sign of the coefficient estimate. 10 We have carried out sensitivity test by considering the effects of an extended set of control variables (namely, property rights, regime durability, FDI, government expenditure and ODA) using panel-2SLS where 'remittances' are instrumented by their own lag and the income gap between each country and the US. In all the cases, the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate of remittances is unchanged. A full set of the results will be furnished on request.
14 with remittances. It is postulated based on this finding and our previous results that, while remittance flows may alleviate financial constraints and thus stimulate economic development, they may also be a source of output shocks, e.g. arising from the situations where countries are unable to buffer against sudden swings in inflows. 11 Macro policies to stabilize financial inflows at the aggregate level are considered to be important for these countries.
[ Table 2 to be inserted around here]
Remittance and Poverty in Asia
In this sub-section, we examine how remittances would affect poverty in Asian countries as an extension of the growth regressions in the previous sections along the lines of Imai et al. (2010) .
Among various poverty measures including both income and non-income indicators, we use international poverty headcount measures based on US$1.25 or US$2 a day, estimated by the World Bank (Ravallion et al. 2008) , as they cover a wide range of countries and years. However, as these poverty data are usually based on household surveys which take place once in few years, the corresponding panel is highly unbalanced. Constrained by limited data, we have used a parsimonious specification in which log of growth rate of GDP per capita is estimated by a smaller number of explanatory variables, that is, (a 2 period) lagged growth of agricultural value added per worker, or lagged (level of) agricultural value added per worker, or lagged (level of) GDP per capita as an instrument to capture the long-run effect of agricultural productivity on growth), investment, financial development, remittances, trade in the first stage of Fixed-effects 11 The results based on the impulse response functions for the volatility of remittances and FDI show that an exogenous shock to the volatility of both types of capital inflows contracts economic growth-especially in the short run (i.e. in 2 to 3 years after the shock), where countries may find it harder to adjust to unexpected changes in capital inflows. The results will be supplied on request.
except the instrument. Table 1 . There is a striking difference in the effect of agricultural production on growth depending on whether we use the level or growth. In Case (a), we observe a strong and statistically highly significant effect of lagged agricultural growth on economic growth (consistent with a key role of agricultural sector as an engine of economic growth). However, in Case (b), the coefficient estimate of the level of agricultural value added per worker becomes negative and statistically significant. This presumably reflects the convergence effect of agricultural production, that is, a country with low initial agricultural production tends to have a higher growth than those with high initial production. If we replace lagged agricultural value added per worker by lagged GDP per capita in Case (c), another and more conventional specification to check for growth convergence, we find a similar pattern of results. The results of other variables are the same as before -investment, financial development, and remittances have positive and significant coefficients. However, trade openness is positive but non-significant.
[ Table 3 be inserted]
In the second stage, the share of remittances in GDP is negatively associated with poverty in Cases (b) and (c). It follows that remittances not only promote economic growth, as evidenced by the results in both Tables 1 and 3 , but also reduce poverty as shown in Table 3 (on the two 16 criteria of US$1.25 and US$2). The underidentification test suggests that the equations are not underidentified, i.e., the instruments are relevant and correlated with the endogenous variable.
However, in Case (a), the coefficient estimate of remittances is negative and not significant in the second stage of poverty equation. Simulation requires significant coefficient estimates and thus we will use Case (b) in Table 3 for poverty simulations.
As both dependent and explanatory variables are in logarithms, the coefficient estimates in Table 3 (Case (b)) are elasticities. Table 4 shows the magnitude of the effects of remittances on poverty. In the case of headcount ratio (US$1.25), the indirect effect of remittances on poverty (0.372) is obtained by multiplying 1.878 (the elasticity of economic growth with respect to remittances) and 0.198 (the elasticity of poverty with respect to economic growth) assuming that other factors are unchanged. With regard to the direct effect, the elasticity of poverty with respect to remittances is -0.500. This is much larger than the indirect effect in absolute terms and the total effect is -0.128. This implies that a 1% increase in the share of remittances in GDP (e.g.
10% to 10.1%) leads to a 0.128% decrease in the headcount ratio (from 10% to 9.987%) ceteris paribus. Likewise, in the case of the US$2 poverty, the indirect effect of remittance is obtained as 0.198 and the direct effect is -0.280, leading to the total effect of -0.082 ceteris paribus.
12
[ Table 4 be inserted]
We have estimated the change in the poverty headcount ratio for 10 selected countries using these elasticity estimates. 13 Three cases have illustrative value -a 10%, 20%, or 50% increase in the current remittance ratio and their poverty effects. For example, in Bangladesh, a 50%
increase of the share of remittances in GDP (from 11.78% to 17.67%) would increase GDP per 12 Our results are consistent with Adams (2011) who surveyed 50 studies on the economic impact of international remittances and concluded that remittances generally have a positive impact on poverty and health, while they can have negative effects on economic growth drawing mainly on Chami et al. (2005) . 13 A full set of country-level results will be supplied on request.
capita growth rate from 4.30% to 4.97% and reduce the poverty headcount (on US$1.25 a day) from 49.60% to 46.43% and that on the higher cut-off (US$2.00 a day) from 81.30% to 77.97%.
These results imply that remittances reduce poverty significantly, especially extreme poverty.
A few other cases further corroborate these results. In India, a 50% increase in the share of remittances in GDP (3.59% to 5.39%) accelerates economic growth (from 7.65% to 8.84%) and reduces the US$1.25 poverty from 41.6% to 38.94%, and the US$2 poverty from 75.60% to 72.50%. Again, a potential reduction in poverty arising from increased remittances is substantial.
Similar results are obtained for Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In Nepal, where the remittance share has increased significantly in recent years, a 50% increase in it -a rise in the share from 23.83% to 35.75% -leads to a poverty reduction from 55.10% to 51.57% (US$1.25 a day) and from 77.60% to 74.42% (US$2.00 a day). If Sri Lanka sees a rise in the share of remittance from 8.01% to 12.02% (i.e by 50%), the headcount ratio (on US$2.00) will reduce from 29.1% to 27.91%. These results will, however, have to be interpreted with some caution as the same elasticity estimates are applied to all countries in the sample. However, it would be safe to conclude that increase in remittances not only promotes economic growth but also reduces poverty.
Given the large population in some countries like India, poverty reduction by only 2 or 3 percentages is likely to be important in terms of potential policy impacts. It seems particularly important to find that direct effects of remittances on poverty are dominant. If we interpret these results in policy terms, government should be aware that policies to help poor families and their relatives send money internationally would reduce poverty significantly. However, as the poor tend to have limited access to remittances, government policies directly supporting the poor should be implemented as the same time.
Concluding Observations
The present study re-examined the effects of remittances on growth of GDP per capita using annual panel data for 24 Asia and Pacific countries. The results confirm that remittances flows have been beneficial to economic growth. This finding is robust to endogeneity concerns.
However, the paper also presents some new evidence that the volatility of remittance and FDI is harmful to economic growth. This means that, while remittances contribute to better economic performance, they are also a source of output shocks. Finally, remittances contribute to poverty reduction -especially through their direct effects. This result is robust to two measures of poverty, estimated using the cut-off points of $1.25 per capita/day and $2 per capita/day.
Migration and remittances are thus potentially a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts. However, we argue that they should not be seen as a panacea for growth and poverty reduction as they have been linked with, among other things, lower work effort, brain drain and Dutch disease. Also, remittances cannot act a substitute for official sources of capital such as aid, as private money cannot be expected to contribute towards public projects.
Moreover, not all poor households receive remittances, and public funds are meant to alleviate poverty. Nonetheless, in tandem with both the theoretical and empirical literature, our results suggest that remittances can have a positive effect on growth and poverty reduction. A supplementary conclusion emanating from this study is that policy makers should adopt policies that encourage the use of remittances for physical and human capital investments so as to harness its full potential for economic development. More specifically, as emphasised in Global Forum Specifically, a major concern is how to bring remittances into the formal financial system.
Although most of the migrants are not from very poor households with no access to credits, they are still unable to access conventional financial services. Banks avoid lending them as risks of transferring cash remain high, stemming from penalties for abetting money laundering and financing terrorism. So migrants tend to rely on costly money-transfer services or other informal modes of transfer. What is worse, at their destination savings often "end up under the mattressrather than channeled into microfinance schemes, for instance". 16 This vicious circle between failure to reap full potential of remittances and limited access to formal financial channels needs to be broken. Lower transfer fees are only a part of the solution. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 1 Variables are in log form.
